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Countries around the world have sought to stop the spread of the 2019 novel 28 
coronavirus (COVID-19) by severely restricting travel and in-person commercial 29 
activities. While it is too early to assess the cost of the current pandemics, we analyse the 30 
economic impacts of a set of “lockdowns” scenarios, using the latest developed modelling 31 
framework of global supply chains. We find that economic losses related to initial 32 
COVID-19 lockdowns are largely dependent on the number of countries imposing 33 
restrictions, and that losses are more sensitive to the duration of a lockdown than its 34 
strictness—suggesting that more severe restrictions can reduce economic damages if 35 
they successfully shorten the duration of a lockdown. However, a longer containment 36 
that can eradicate the disease imposes lower economic damages than a series of shorter 37 
ones. Our results also reveal some important vulnerabilities in global supply chains: 38 
Even countries that are not directly affected by COVID-19 can experience large losses 39 
(e.g., >20% of their GDP)—with such cascading impacts often occurring in low- and 40 
middle-income countries. Open and highly-specialized economies suffer particularly 41 
large losses (e.g., energy-exporting Central Asian countries or tourism-focused 42 
Caribbean countries). Supply bottlenecks and declines in consumer demand lead to 43 
especially large losses in globalized sectors such as electronics (production decreases of 44 
13-53% across our scenarios) and automobiles (2-49%). Our findings suggest that 45 
earlier, stricter, and thus shorter lockdowns are likely to minimize overall economic 46 
damages, that a “go-slow” approach to lifting restrictions may reduce overall damages if 47 
it avoids further lockdowns, and that global supply chains will magnify economic losses 48 
in some countries and industry sectors regardless of direct effects of the coronavirus. 49 
Pandemics control is a public good but is dependent on the weakest link in the global 50 
division of production. Economic impacts can be only minimized if collective efforts are 51 
made to strengthen the least effective providers.  52 
The disease caused by 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) emerged in China in late 53 
December, but quickly spread to other major countries1 in Asia, Europe and North America 54 
and was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) on March 112. There 55 
are now confirmed COVID-19 cases in nearly every country in the world, and the WHO has 56 
urged affected countries to slow the spread of the virus by imposing containment and 57 
suppression measures3,4 ranging from strict controls on travel, social gatherings, and 58 
commercial activities aimed at “flattening the curve” (i.e. decreasing the rate of new 59 
infections to avoid overwhelming health care systems) to less strict measures designed to 60 
shield immunologically-compromised individuals, treat victims, and achieving “herd 61 
immunity” (i.e. a sufficiently large number of recovered and thus immune individuals to 62 
prevent effective spread of the virus)5. Differences in the strictness of such policies and the 63 
rapidity with which jurisdictions have imposed and relaxed the policies reflect divergent (and 64 
perhaps hasty) assessments of both the public health risk of COVID-19 and the social and 65 
economic impacts of the different policies6,7. Here, using a newly-developed economic 66 
disaster model8-10, we quantitatively assess the economic impacts of different containment 67 
strategies across countries and industry sectors in order to both inform ongoing efforts to 68 
contain COVID-19 and to reveal more generally how pandemic-related economic losses will 69 
be distributed along global supply chains. 70 
 
Details of our analytic approach are provided in the Methods section. In summary, we 71 
model the short-term economic shocks of different COVID-19 response scenarios as 72 
sector-specific transportation and labour supply constraints. The model operates at weekly 73 
time-steps, using the latest available global input-output data11 and taking into account 74 
interactions throughout complex global supply chains and the contexts of scarcity and 75 
imbalance that prevail in most markets10, 12. It should be noted that our model is distinct from 76 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models in that it is specifically designed to assess 77 
economic impacts in response to disasters that unfold over weeks or months, before 78 
production structures and trade networks have time to adjust to new production patterns. 79 
Moreover, the goal of this study is not to predict the true cost of the COVID-19 pandemic, but 80 
to identify the most important factors (e.g., the strictness, duration, and recurrence of 81 
lockdowns) and test the sensitivity of economic impacts to those factors as those impacts 82 
ripple through global supply chains, supporting by several sets of scenarios for containment 83 
measures. Thus, in addition to showing how overall damages might change under different 84 
policy scenarios, the incidence of damages across sectors and countries may inform the 85 
allocation of international aid and economic stimulus. 86 
We model four different sets of pandemic scenarios, three of which represent different 87 
spread extents and containment responses to the COVID-19 pandemic (shown in Fig. 1 & 5 88 
and Fig. S2), and the last of which assesses both the damages of sustaining some restrictions 89 
over a longer period as well as the losses if lockdowns are imposed again next autumn or 90 
winter. Spatial spread refers to the global extent of the pandemic: the number of countries 91 
affected. Duration refers to the number of months lockdown measures are in place. Strictness 92 
is measured by the percentage by which labour availability and transportation capacity13 are 93 
reduced relative to pre-pandemic levels. Given that the impacts of lockdown measures on 94 
labour availability depend on the characteristics of production, we develop specific 95 
impact-to-labour ‘multipliers’ for each sector based on three factors: the level exposure to the 96 
virus (i.e., the degree and proximity of in-person interactions), essential or lifeline sectors 97 
(e.g., electricity), and the option of performing work from home (e.g., education). Therefore, 98 
sector-specific constraints on labour availability are determined by both the strictness of 99 
lockdown measures represented in the scenario (e.g., 80% strictness will reduce overall 100 
transportation capacity by 80%) and the sector-specific multipliers (e.g., 0.5 for wheat 101 
production as the level of exposure is low and 0.1 for electricity and gas supply as essential 102 
activities; see Methods for further detail). Each of the 39 scenarios is a different combination 103 
of spatial spread, duration, and strictness, with results presented in terms of economic impacts 104 
measured in absolute terms of loss in value added (e.g., billions of US dollars) or relative 105 
terms (as a percentage of pre-pandemic value added). 106 
Results 107 
Figure 1 summarizes the results of several representative pandemic scenarios. Panels in the 108 
first column (Figs. 1a, 1d, 1g, 1j) show the economic impacts if COVID-19 had been 109 
successfully contained in China only. Panels in the second column (Figs. 1b, 1e, 1h, 1k) show 110 
the economic impacts if COVID-19 had spread from China to Europe and the U.S., which had 111 
implemented lockdowns, but no further. And panels in the last column (Figs. 1c, 1f, 1i, 1l) 112 
 
show the economic impacts when the virus further spreads globally and all remaining 113 
countries place containment measures. Although some of these results are outdated given the 114 
reality of the disease’s global spread, it may nonetheless be useful to examine the differences 115 
in impacts as a function of spatial spread (see Supplementary Information for further details). 116 
For each of the different spatial spreads (columns in Fig. 1), Figure 1 also shows results of 3 117 
different lockdown strictness-duration combinations: from 80% restriction for 2 months (Figs. 118 
1a-1c) to 60% restriction for 6 months (Figs. 1g-1i). Note that China’s lockdown is 119 
consistently modelled as an 80% restriction for the 2 months of January and February14 in the 120 
scenarios of greater spatial spread, with restrictions in Europe and the U.S. beginning in 121 
March, and restrictions in the remaining countries (in the global scenario) beginning in April 122 
(see Methods and Supplementary Fig. S2). 123 
 124 
Figure 1 | Economic impacts (value-added loss) of COVID-19 under different lockdown scenarios. 125 
Maps show results from 9 scenario of the 36 modelled scenarios, with different combinations of spatial 126 
spread (columns of panels), lockdown duration and strictness (rows of panels; see Methods, scenario 127 
set table). Strictness represents the level of reductions in transportation capacity and labour availability 128 
relative to pre-pandemic levels. Percentages in the corner of each map indicate the global value-added 129 
losses for each scenario, with shading denoting the regional distributions of these losses. The bar charts 130 
(j-l) summarize all 36 scenarios, showing the sensitivity of global value-added losses to duration 131 
(different stacks) and strictness (shading of stacked bars). 132 
The first insight from the model is that the global cost of the pandemic depends foremost on 133 
the number of affected countries, and then on the required duration of lockdown policies; in 134 
contrast, the strictness of these policies is comparatively less important. The spatial extent of 135 
the pandemic is the most important driver of the global cost. If only China had been affected, 136 
our results suggest that the global economic impacts (measured by value-added) would have 137 
 
been 3.5% of global GDP (Fig.1a). With the spread to highly developed western countries and 138 
containment measures placed in Europe and the U.S., we find the global economic impacts 139 
increase almost four-fold to 12.6% (Fig.1b). Finally, the modelled impacts of global 140 
lockdowns in response to COVID-19 are greater still: 26.8% of global GDP (Fig.1c). The 141 
magnitude of lockdown duration is illustrated by Figures 1f and 1i, which both show the 142 
effects of global spread and relatively strict (60%) lockdowns for 4 and 6 months, 143 
respectively. In this case, global value-added losses increase slightly more than 4% (from 144 
26.3% to 30.8%; Figs. 1f and 1i). 145 
Figures 1j, 1k, and 1l further emphasize the rapid increase in global losses with the duration 146 
of lockdowns, especially under stricter policies. For example, in the strictest lockdown 147 
scenarios (i.e., 80%) with global spread, the global economic impacts rise from $20.0 trillion 148 
under a 2-month duration (blue bars in Fig 1l) to $22.7 trillion under a 4-month duration 149 
(green bars in Fig 1l) and $30.1 trillion (equivalent to 40.3% of global value-added) under a 150 
6-month duration (red bars in Fig 1l). However, the same bar charts show that global 151 
economic losses are relatively less sensitive to the strictness of lockdown measures than either 152 
the extent of pandemic or duration of the lockdown. For example, if only China is affected 153 
(China only scenario, Fig. S3), double the strictness would lead to almost linear economic 154 
impact under 2 months duration. As the duration increases, the economic impact is less 155 
sensitive to changes of strictness. In the global scenario the global impacts of 2 months of 156 
lockdown are only 7.2% larger under a strictness of 80% than 20% (darker and lighter blue 157 
bars in Fig 1l). Although both duration and strictness determine domestic production (via 158 
labour supply) and transportation capacity linking to upstream suppliers and downstream 159 
consumers, the economic damages via supply chain linkages are much more sensitive to the 160 
former. 161 
 162 
Figure 2 | Direct and indirect value-added losses of COVID-19 in selected countries under 9 163 
scenarios. The bar charts a-i present economic loss (measured by the percentage of value-added losses) 164 
in selected nine countries. The top row country includes China (affected in China-only scenario), and 165 
 
developed countries such as the US (affected in Europe + U.S. scenario) and New Zealand (only 166 
affected in Global scenario). The middle row is countries (affected in Global scenario) which have 167 
close supply chain relationships with China to assess propagation effects. The bottom row shows 168 
countries with a dominant economic sector. Each sub-figure contains three selected scenarios from the 169 
three scenario sets (12 per figure). Three colour bars respond to 2 (blue), 4 (yellow), 6 (red) months in 170 
duration. The gridded area in bars represent direct losses due to containments and the solid area 171 
represents the propagation. See Fig. S4 - S11 for the results of some other selected counties. 172 
The second insight is the importance of propagation through global supply chains: even 173 
countries that are not directly affected by the virus experience large losses, and low- and 174 
middle-income countries are more vulnerable to indirect effects. Figure 2 presents direct (i.e. 175 
due to domestic containment measures such as lockdown or suppression; hashed areas of bars) 176 
and propagation effects via international supply chains across the three scenarios sets (not 177 
hashed areas of bars). In the scenarios of an outbreak contained in China, direct losses by 178 
definition occur in China only, but are nonetheless substantial: 16.7% of China’s annual GDP 179 
(Fig. 2a). However, even if the virus had been confined to China, its economic disruption 180 
would not have been. Forward and backward propagations along supply chains within China 181 
and with other countries add another 4.8% to China’s losses to cause overall impacts of 21.5% 182 
of annual value-added. For example, although the United States (U.S.) and New Zealand are 183 
not directly affected by COVID-19 in this scenario, they would still suffer respectively 0.6% 184 
and 2.2% value-added losses during an 80% strict, 2-month lockdown in China due to the 185 
decline in China’s output (i.e. negative forward effects) as well as shrinking of China’s final 186 
demand for their products (negative backward effect). Under the same scenario, countries 187 
such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Nigeria, which are closely linked to China’s supply chains, 188 
would experience losses of 5.2%, 3.6% and 3.1% of their GDP, respectively. Perhaps 189 
surprisingly, specialized economies like Kazakhstan (energy), Mongolia (livestock), and 190 
Jamaica (tourism) experience even larger losses, with 6.1%, 4.2% and 11.4% drops in their 191 
annual GDP, respectively (Figs. 2d-2i). Similarly, countries where the virus has been 192 
controlled can be continuously affected by imported losses. Assuming the virus is controlled 193 
in China over two months but spreads globally, China nonetheless suffers ongoing economic 194 
due to propagations: $5.77 trillion in the global scenario where lockdowns are 40% strict for 6 195 
months (see “China” in GB panel in Supplementary Fig. S2). 196 
Despite the propagation of lockdown losses through supply chains15, pandemic control 197 
remains a public goods. In particular, non-affected countries benefit enormously from 198 
effective containment measures in affected countries. For example, if only China had been 199 
affected, most of the economic impacts in other countries would have been delayed by weeks 200 
or months (depending on which country; see Supplementary Fig. S2), as firms used their 201 
inventories to smooth the shock. Specifically, with 2 months of the strictest lockdown 202 
measures in China, but no spread of the virus beyond China (i.e. China only, 80%-2m; top 203 
blue bar of each panel in Fig. 2), our results indicate 21.6% of China’s value-added is lost, 204 
while economic impacts in other countries are much smaller than in the scenarios when those 205 
countries are also directly affected (i.e., the global scenario bars in Fig. 2).  206 
Similarly, if the virus had been contained in those highly developed western countries by a 207 
strict 2-months containment (i.e. Europe + U.S., 80%-2m; blue bars near the center of each 208 
 
panel in Fig. 2), Europe and the U.S. suffer much larger direct losses of 15%-20% of their 209 
GDP.  The economic impacts in countries not directly affected increase with the duration of 210 
lockdowns in affected countries. For example, the loss in Ethiopia will increase from 2.5% 211 
under the Europe and the U.S. 80% - 2 month lockdown to 9.8% under a 6 month lockdown 212 
(Fig. S2). But this is still much less than the 27.9% losses in Ethiopia under the global spread 213 
and 6 months of 40% strict lockdowns. Although these findings are too late to affect public 214 
health policies for the first round of the COVID-19 pandemic, they demonstrate that 215 
containment has both substantial positive externalities, in that all countries benefited 216 
considerably when China placed the strictest measures, and negative externalities, in that all 217 
countries suffer from containment in the U.S. due to reduced demand in global markets. But 218 
our estimates show the positive externality of containments dominates.  219 
 220 
221 
 222 
Figure 3 | Examples of supply chain effects on Chinese electronics and German automotive 223 
sectors in scenarios of global spread. Supply chain impacts to China’s electronic-manufacturing 224 
industries under three scenario-sets (China only 80%-2 months (a, b), Europe and the U.S. 60%-4 225 
months (c, d) and Global 40%-6 months (e, f). a, c and e show the economic impacts to China's 226 
electronics industry’s upstream supply chain; and b, d, f represent the economic impacts from the 227 
perspective of downstream supply chains. Different colours of each bar represent the strength of 228 
linkage between industries and China's electronics industry (change from blue to red). In the upstream 229 
supply chains, the redder the bar is, the more important suppliers of China's electronics industry would 230 
be; downstream, the redder bar indicates that these sectors are the main clients of China's electronics 231 
industry. The length of bars in a-f depict the industries’ relative production losses compared with the 232 
 
original capacity under different scenario-sets. Colors of bars represent the cohesion level of the 233 
particular sector to Chinese electronics from blue (weak) to red (strong), which is measured by the 234 
trade volume between the particular sector and Chinese electronics. See Fig. S12 - S14 for the results 235 
of some other industries in different countries. 236 
The third insight is that specific country-sectors are quite vulnerable to impacts propagated 237 
via global supply chains, even in scenarios where COVID-19 does not spread globally. 238 
Figures 3 and 4 show the upstream and downstream impacts related to the Chinese electronics 239 
and German automotive sectors, respectively. Each of these sectors are important to the 240 
economies of China and Germany, respectively, and each also depend upon extensive 241 
international supply chains. 242 
China’s electronics supply-chain is labour intensive and has ‘scale-free’ property7, i.e. there 243 
is a clustered hub in China with connections to a large number of firms in electronics, 244 
chemical and metal production in countries throughout Asia16. In scenarios where COVID-19 245 
is confined to China by a strict, 2-month lockdown (i.e., China only, 80%-2m scenario), the 246 
global value-added related to China’s electronics sector would have been reduced by 27.3% 247 
(including 20.8% in direct losses) (Supplementary Fig. S15). However, the impacts to China’s 248 
electronics sector trigger substantial upstream production declines in South Korean 249 
electronics, Japanese electronics and Australian metals (in each case by roughly 21%; Fig. 3a). 250 
Although electronic products are largely substitutable, major production lines are centralised 251 
in China16, such that there are also large downstream impacts as reduced output limits final 252 
consumption, particularly in the U.S., Japan, Mexico, and France (where reductions are >28%; 253 
Fig. 3b). In the scenario of global spread and 6 months of lockdowns (i.e. global, 40%-6m), 254 
the recovery of China's labour supply and transportation capacity to pre-disaster levels do not 255 
prevent ongoing impacts to its electronics sector via global supply chains (largely forward 256 
effects from upstream Asian countries), which further reduce the sector’s output from 29.9% 257 
to 32.8% (Fig. 3e, Supplementary Fig. S15). In this global scenario, downstream consumption 258 
in countries like the U.S., Japan, Mexico and France are reduced by a total of 40% (Fig. 3f). 259 
 
 260 
 261 
Figure 4 | Supply chain impacts to German automobile industries under three main scenario-sets. 262 
a, c and e show the economic impacts to supply chain upstream of German automobile industries and b, 263 
d, f represent the economic impacts from the perspective of downstream supply chain. The setting of 264 
scenario-sets, circle colour and area are similar with that of Fig 3. The length of bars in a-f depict the 265 
industries’ relative production losses compared with the original capacity under different scenario-sets. 266 
Colors of bars represent the cohesion level of the particular sector to German Automotive from blue 267 
(weak) to red (strong), which is measured by the trade volume between the particular sector and 268 
German Automotive. 269 
Automotive sectors are similarly international17, with highly-specialized suppliers that make 270 
short-term substitution difficult18. In the scenario where only China imposes lockdown 271 
measures (i.e. the China only 80%-2m scenario), economic impacts to the German automobile 272 
are modest: losses of 1.8% of value-added as China’s demand for German motor parts and 273 
vehicles fall by roughly 20% (Fig. 4b; Supplementary Fig. S16) and reductions in the output 274 
of various Chinese sectors (e.g., electronics, metals and rubber and plastics) constrain 275 
upstream production of motor parts in the U.S. and the U.K and electronics in Germany. With 276 
the spread of COVID-19 to highly developed western countries (i.e. Europe and the U.S., 277 
60%-4m scenario), however, labour and transportation constraints in Germany and many of 278 
the countries that supply auto parts and raw materials (Supplementary Fig. S16) cause 279 
production by the German automotive sector to fall by 28.8% (24.8% directly due to local 280 
containment, and 4.0% due to effects upstream, Fig. 4c). Such decreases in German 281 
 
production ripple upstream to suppliers in Hungary, Spain, Italy, and the U.S., and 282 
downstream demand for German cars declines in the U.S., China and Austria by 29.1%, 37.6% 283 
and 22.3%, respectively (Fig. 4d). In the case of global spread and more widespread and 284 
longer-term lockdowns (i.e. global, 40%-6m scenario; Fig. 4e), the output of German 285 
automobile industries decreases by a further 0.9%.  Reduced supplies from low- and 286 
middle-income countries to Germany (Fig. S16) lead German producers to look for new 287 
suppliers (“substitution effect”). On the other hand, the production of motor parts in the U.S. 288 
rebounds slightly in this scenario, but the overall impacts of such global spread remain 289 
strongly negative everywhere. Consumption of German cars in the U.S. and Austria fall by 290 
29.5%., and—although Chinese demand for German cars in this scenario returns to 291 
pre-pandemic levels in April—supply chain and transportation constraints nonetheless reduce 292 
Chinese consumption of German cars by 37.5%. 293 
Our results also highlight the vulnerability of sectors like catering and tourism to pandemic 294 
lockdowns19 which are exposed to both very large decreases in demand and the propagation 295 
of losses from upstream suppliers such as food and business sectors20. For example, in 296 
scenarios of global pandemic (e.g., the global, 40%-6m scenario), very large reductions in 297 
domestic and international travel and tourism (Fig. S17) cause tourism in Jamaica to decline 298 
by 56.3%, in turn reducing imports of beverages and tobacco products from the U.S. falling to 299 
46.7% of pre-pandemic levels (Fig. S17). 300 
As a final analysis, we model three different scenarios of recovery from the global spread of 301 
the COVID-19 pandemic: (1) a “new normal” scenario in which each country’s lockdown (i.e. 302 
China 80%-2m, then all other countries 60%-4m) is first relaxed to 20% strictness and then 303 
back to 0% over a period of 12 months; (2) a “recurrent with global cooperation” scenario, in 304 
which, Round 1: each country’s lockdown (i.e. China 80%-2m, Europe and the U.S. 60%-3m, 305 
all other countries 40%-4m) is first relaxed to 0% strictness over a period of 2 months, 306 
followed by a 3-month period of no restrictions, and then Round 2: all countries act together 307 
by placing strictest (80%), 2-month global lockdown to minimize virus spreading; and (3) a 308 
“recurrent without global cooperation” scenario, in which, Round 1: each country’s lockdown 309 
(i.e. China 80%-2m, Europe and the U.S. 60%-3m, all other countries 40%-4m) is first 310 
relaxed to 0% strictness over a period of 2 months, followed by a 3 month period of no 311 
restrictions, and then Round 2: all countries place same less strict but longer lockdowns as the 312 
first round. 313 
These recovery scenarios lead to a fourth and final insight: relaxing lockdown restrictions 314 
gradually over a long time period (in our “new normal” scenario, 12 months) results in 315 
substantially lower economic impacts than lifting restrictions quickly if it means avoiding 316 
another round of strict lockdowns in the coming year. Globally, we estimate overall 317 
value-added losses in the “new normal” scenario to be 39.5%, as compared to 49.5% and 61.5% 318 
in the “recurrent” scenarios (Fig. 5a-5c). The differences are particularly striking in the U.S., 319 
where losses related to recurrent lockdowns are 24.6%-54.8% greater than the slow relaxation 320 
of restrictions (see light-blue shading in Figs. 2d-2f). As shown in our scenarios of initial 321 
lockdowns, if the pandemic does recur, stricter and shorter lockdowns (which may depend 322 
upon global coordination) also greatly reduce losses, by 11% globally in our estimates (Figs. 323 
 
5b, 5c). The implications of these different recovery trajectories for selected sectors are shown 324 
in Figures 5g-5i; as with losses globally or in specific countries, recurrent lockdowns are 325 
considerably worse (e.g., by 33.1-90.8% worse in the sectors depicted). 326 
 327 
 328 
Figure 5 | Economic impacts of recovery scenarios. Maps (a-c) show results from three post 329 
pandemic recovery scenarios, with different potential recovery strategies. Percentages in the bottom of 330 
each map indicate the global value-added losses. Changes of color shades represent the severity of 331 
economic impact by countries. The stacked area plots (d-f) show the dynamics of the value-added loss 332 
in different countries or regions. The bar charts (g-i) illustrate the value-added loss in ten selected 333 
sectors under different recovery trajectories. 334 
Discussion 335 
Our modelling of COVID-19 lockdowns demonstrate the enormous economic impacts of 336 
the number of affected countries, the duration and strictness of lockdowns, and how 337 
restrictions are relaxed as the pandemic abates—in each case factors influenced or determined 338 
by public health policy choices across the globe21, 22. We have enumerated several insights 339 
based on our results, which together suggest that economic losses will be minimized by 340 
stricter initial lockdowns, provided that such strictness would reduce the duration of the 341 
measures. And indeed, emerging results of related research seem to support exactly this 342 
relationship14. Yet our modelling of recovery scenarios suggests that an extended period of 343 
some restrictions (e.g., 20% reductions in labour and transportation capacity in our “new 344 
normal” scenario) is nonetheless economically preferable to a more rapid return to 345 
pre-pandemic activities followed by another round of global lockdowns. This is a critical but 346 
perhaps inconvenient finding for policymakers eager to lift restrictions and stimulate 347 
 
economic recovery. 348 
Our results also illustrate the substantial and heterogenous impacts propagated via global 349 
supply chains, which affect the level of economic impacts to a country or sector in ways that 350 
are not always intuitive. Moreover, just as individuals staying home protect others as well as 351 
themselves, so countries imposing strict lockdowns provide a public good to other countries23, 352 
24. For example, we estimate that a strict lockdown which contained the COVID-19 outbreak 353 
to China would reduce global GDP by 3.5% while costing China 21% of its GDP. The 354 
relatively positive externalities of public health measures to prevent a pandemic may lead to 355 
market failures, leading to under-investment and delayed action from the perspective of 356 
global optimization. In preparing for the next emerging disease, a global cost-sharing 357 
instrument could ensure that the costs of monitoring, containment, and suppression are fairly 358 
distributed, removing some of the disincentives to early action and providing enormous global 359 
health and economic benefits over the long term. 360 
Data availability 361 
All data and R codes are deposited at our data publishing website – China Emission Accounts 362 
and Datasets (http://www.ceads.net/?ddownload=3188). Those data can be also obtained from 363 
the corresponding author on reasonable request. 364 
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Methods 440 
Disaster impact model. Our impact model is an extension of the adaptive regional 441 
input-output (ARIO) model23, 24, which is widely used in the literature to simulate the 442 
propagation of negative shocks throughout the economy11, 12, 25-27. Our model improves the 443 
ARIO model in two ways. The first improvement is related to the substitutability of products 444 
from the same sector sourced from different regions. Second, in our model, clients will 445 
choose their suppliers across regions based on their capacity. These two improvements 446 
contribute to a more realistic representation of bottlenecks along global supply chains. It 447 
should be noted that, although general equilibrium models which are often used for economic 448 
assessment can also handle the above two points well, it does not model well short-term 449 
(disruption in a few weeks or months after a shock) simulations and disequilibrium situations 450 
as shocks present. In CGE models, we assume that changes in relative prices balance supply 451 
and demand. This is an ideal description in the long run. However, in the short run, because of 452 
socioeconomic inertia, transaction costs, and antigouging legislation, adjustment through 453 
prices appears unlikely in the aftermath of a disaster24. Hence, IO models are frequently 454 
preferred to represent short-term economic dynamics, in which production technologies are 455 
fixed and prices cannot adjust. CGE models, on the other hand, are preferred for modelling 456 
long-term dynamics, in which flexibility in production processes and markets allow for an 457 
adjustment of the economic system24. Our model also has some disadvantages. For example, 458 
the effect of expectations is not considered. Another limitation of our model is the inability to 459 
endogenously consider changes in technology. But in these short-term scenarios and 460 
situations following a shock technical changes are rather unlikely. Our model is designed to 461 
identify the most important containment factors among the strictness, duration, and recurrence 462 
of lockdowns and measure the magnitude of propagation effects through global supply chains. 463 
The analytical framework setting are fundamentally different to other macroeconomic 464 
analysis28-30 aiming at predicting true cost of the COVID-19. 465 
 466 
Our disaster impact model includes 4 main modules, i.e., production module, allocation 467 
module, demand module and simulation module. The production module is designed for 468 
characterizing the firm's production activities. The allocation module is used to describe how 469 
firms allocate output to their clients, including downstream firms (intermediate demand) and 470 
households (final demand). The demand module is used to describe how clients place orders 471 
to their suppliers. And the simulation module is designed for executing the whole simulation 472 
 
procedure. 473 
 474 
Production module. The production module is used to characterize production processes. 475 
Firms rent capital and employ labour to process natural resources and intermediate inputs 476 
produced by other firms into a specific product (see figure S1). The production process for 477 
firm  can expressed as follows, 478 = for	all	 , ;  
where  denotes the output of the firm, in monetary values;  denotes type of intermediate 479 
products;  denotes intermediate products used in production processes;  denotes the 480 
primary inputs to production, such as labour ( ), capital ( ) and natural resources ( ). (∙) 481 
is the production function for firms. There are a wide range of functional forms, such as 482 
Leontief 31, Cobb-Douglas (C-D) and Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production 483 
function32. Different functional forms reflect the possibility for firms to substitute an input for 484 
another. Considering that epidemics often cause large-scale economic fluctuations in the short 485 
term, during which economic agents do not have enough time to adjust other inputs to 486 
substitute temporary shortages, we use Leontief production function which does not allow 487 
substitution between inputs.  488 
= for	all	 , ; 	  
where  and 	are the input coefficients calculated as 489 =	 ̅̅  
and  490 =	 ̅  
where the horizontal bar indicates the value of that variable in the equilibrium state. In an 491 
equilibrium state, producers use intermediate products and primary inputs to produce goods 492 
and services to satisfy demand from their clients. After a disaster, output will decline. From a 493 
production perspective, there are mainly the following constraints: 494 
Labour supply constraints. Labour constraints after a disaster may impose severe knock-on 495 
effects on the rest of the economy33-35. This makes labour constraints a key factor to consider 496 
in disaster impact analysis. For example, in the case of a pandemic, these constraints can arise 497 
from employees’ inability to work as a result of illness or death, or from the inability to go to 498 
work and the requirement to work at home (if possible). In this model, the proportion of 499 
surviving productive capacity from the constrained labour productive capacity ( ) after a 500 
shock is defined as36-38:  501 ( ) = 1 − ( ) ∗ ̅  
Where ( ) is the proportion of labour that is unavailable at each time step  during 502 
containment. (1 − ( )) contains the available proportion of employment at time . 503 ( ) = ( − ( ))/  
The proportion of the available productive capacity of labour is thus a function of the losses 504 
 
from the sectoral labour forces and its pre-disaster employment level. Following the 505 
assumption of fixed input-output relationships, the productive capacity of labour in each 506 
region after a disaster ( ) will represent a linear proportion of the available labour capacity 507 
at each time step39, 40. Take COVID-19 as an example, during an outbreak of an infectious 508 
disease, authorities often adopt social distancing and other measures to reduce the risk of 509 
infection. This imposes an exogenous negative shock on the economic network. 510 
Supply constraints. Firms will purchase intermediate products from their supplier in each 511 
period. Insufficient inventory of a firm's intermediate products will create a bottleneck for 512 
production activities. The potential production level that the inventory of the  513 
intermediate product can support is 514 
( ) = ( − 1) 
where ( − 1) refers to the amount of  intermediate products held by firm  at the 515 
end of time step − 1. 516 
Considering all the limitation mentioned above, the maximum supply capacity of firm  can 517 
be expressed as 518 
( ) = ( ); ( ); for	all	 , ( )  
The actual production of firm , ( ), depends on both its maximum supply capacity and 519 
the total orders the firm received from its clients (see the Demand Module), 520 ( ) = ( ( ), ( − 1)) 
The inventory held by firm  will be consumed during the production process, 521 , ( ) = ∗ ( ) 
 522 
Allocation module. The allocation module mainly describes how suppliers allocate products 523 
to their clients. When some firms in the economic system suffer a negative shock, their 524 
production will be constrained by a shortage to primary inputs such as a shortage of labour 525 
supply in the outbreak of COVID-19. In this case, a firm’s output will not be able to fill all 526 
orders of its clients. A rationing scheme that reflects a mechanism based on which a firm 527 
allocates an insufficient amount of products to its clients is needed23, 41. For this case study, we 528 
applied a proportional rationing scheme according to which a firm allocates its output in 529 
proportion to its orders. Under the proportional rationing scheme, the amounts of products of 530 
firm  allocated to firm  and household ℎ is as follows, 531 ( ) = ( − 1)∑ ( − 1) + ∑ ( − 1) ∗ ( ) 
( ) = ( − 1)∑ ( − 1) + ∑ ( − 1) ∗ ( ) 
 
Firm  received intermediates to restore its inventories, 532 , ( ) = ( )→  
Therefore, the amount of intermediate  held by firm  at the end of period  is 533 ( ) = ( − 1) − , ( ) + ,  
 534 
Demand module. The demand module represents a characterization of how firms and 535 
household issues orders to their suppliers at the end of each period. Firm orders its supplier 536 
because of the need to restore its intermediate product inventory. We assume that each firm 537 
has a specific target inventory level based on its maximum supply capacity in each time step, 538 ,∗( ) = 	 ∗ ∗ ( ) 
 539 
Then the order issued by firm  to its supplier  is 540 
( ) = ,∗( ) − ( ) ∗ ∗ ( )∑ ∗ ( )→ ,					if		 ,∗( ) > ( );																																0																																																if	 ,∗( ) ≤ ( ).  
 541 
Households issue orders to their suppliers based on their demand and the supply capacity of 542 
their suppliers. In this study, the demand of household ℎ to final products , ( ), is 543 
given exogenously at each time step. Then, the order issued by household ℎ to its supplier  544 
is 545 ( ) = ( ) ∗ ∗ ( )∑ ∗ ( )→  
 546 
The total order received by firm  is 547 ( ) = ( ) + ( ) 
 548 
Simulation module. At each time step, the actions of firms and households are as follows: 549 
1. Firms plan and execute their production based on three factors: a) inventories of 550 
intermediate products they have, b) supply of primary inputs, and c) orders from 551 
their clients. Firms will maximize their output under these constraints. 552 
2. Product allocation. Firms allocate outputs to clients based on their orders. In 553 
equilibrium, the output of firms just meets all orders. When production is constrained 554 
by exogenous negative shocks, outputs may not cover all orders. In this case, we use 555 
a proportional rationing scheme proposed in the literature23, 41(see Allocation Module) 556 
to allocate products of firms. 557 
3. Firms and household issue orders to their suppliers for the next time step. Firms 558 
place orders with their suppliers based on the gaps in their inventories (target 559 
inventory level minus existing inventory level). Households place orders with their 560 
suppliers based on their demand. When a product comes from multiple suppliers, the 561 
 
allocation of orders is adjusted according to the production capacity of each supplier. 562 
This discrete-time dynamic procedure can reproduce the equilibrium of the economic system, 563 
and can simulate the propagation of exogenous shocks, both from firm and household side, or 564 
transportation disruptions, in the economic network. From the firm side, if the supply of a 565 
firm's primary inputs is constrained, it will have two effects. On the one hand, the decline in 566 
output in this firm means that its clients' orders cannot be fulfilled. This will result in a 567 
decrease in inventory of these clients, which will constrain their production. This is the 568 
so-called forward or downstream effect. On the other hand, less output in this firm also means 569 
less use of intermediate products from its suppliers. This will reduce the number of orders it 570 
places on its suppliers, which will further reduce the production level of its suppliers. This is 571 
the so-called backward or upstream effect. Similarly, these two effects can also occur if the 572 
transport of a firm to its clients or suppliers is restricted. For instance, during the outbreak of 573 
COVID-19 in China, the authorities adopted strict isolation measures. These measures have 574 
placed constraints on the supply of labour and the transportation of products. This led to a 575 
decline in China's output and also triggered the forward and backward effect, which leads to 576 
the propagation of the shock through the global economic production web. From the 577 
household side, the fluctuation of household demand caused by exogenous shocks will also 578 
trigger the aforementioned backward effect. Take tourism as an example, during the outbreak 579 
of COVID-19 in China, the demand for visiting China from tourist all over the world will 580 
decline significantly. This influence will further propagate to the accommodation and catering 581 
industry as well as their suppliers through supplier-client links. 582 
 583 
Economic impacts. We define the value-added decrease of all firms in a network caused by 584 
an exogenous negative shock as the disaster impacts of the shock. It should be noted that in 585 
our estimates, we are not looking at dynamic general equilibrium effects, mortality, 586 
Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALYs) and Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALYs), whereas 587 
economic impacts of the lockdowns are considered. For the firm directly affected by 588 
exogenous negative shocks, its loss includes two parts: a) the value-added decrease caused by 589 
exogenous constraints, and b) the value-added decrease caused by propagation. The former is 590 
the direct loss, while the latter is the indirect loss. A negative shock's total economic impacts 591 
( , ), direct economic impacts ( , ), and propagated economic impacts ( , ) for firm 592 
 in region  are, 593 
, = 	 , ∗ − , ( ) 
and, 594 
, = 	 , ∗ − , ( ) 
and, 595 , = 	 , − ,  
 596 
 597 
Global supply-chain network. We build a global supply chain network based on version 10 598 
of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database11. GTAP 10 provides a multiregional 599 
input-output (MRIO) table for the year 2014. This MRIO table divides the world into 141 600 
 
economies, each of which contains 65 production sectors. If we treat each sector as a firm 601 
(producer), and assume that each region has a representative household, we can obtain the 602 
following information in the MRIO table: a) suppliers and clients of each firm; b) suppliers 603 
for each household, and c) the flow of each supplier-client connection under the equilibrium 604 
state. This provides a benchmark for our model. It should be noted that the MRIO table 605 
provided by GTAP is only a sectoral level network, it cannot capture the complexity of 606 
supply-chain networks at the firm level. Hence, this study only serves as approximation of the 607 
actual effect. Detailed data are rarely available, however, particularly those for supply chains 608 
in developing countries and for global supply chains across countries. 609 
When applying such an aggregated network in the disaster impact model, we need to consider 610 
the substitutability of intermediate products supplied by suppliers from the same sector in 611 
different regions. The substitution between some intermediate products is fairly 612 
straightforward. For example, for a firm that extracts spices from bananas it does not make 613 
much of a difference if the bananas are sourced from the Philippines or Thailand. However, 614 
for a car manufacturing firm in Japan, which uses screws from Chinese auto parts suppliers 615 
and engines from German auto parts suppliers to assemble cars, the products of the suppliers 616 
in these two regions are non-substitutable. If we assume that all goods are non-substitutable as 617 
in the traditional IO model, then we will overestimate the loss of producers such as fragrance 618 
extraction firm. If we assume that products from suppliers in the same sector can be 619 
completely substitutable, then we will significantly underestimate the losses of producers 620 
such as Japanese car manufacturing firm. In order to alleviate the shortcomings of the 621 
evaluation deviation under the two assumptions, we set the possibility of substitution for each 622 
firm based on the region and sector of supplier supply (see Allocation Module of the model). 623 
 624 
Spread and containment scenarios. The number of affected countries, the duration of the 625 
containment and the strictness of the containment are the three important factors influencing 626 
the loss caused by the epidemic. Using these three indicators as dimensions, and then 627 
referring to the actual epidemic situation, we designed three sets of scenarios, i.e., China only 628 
(CN), Europe and U.S. (NH) and Global (GB). Different sets of scenarios represent different 629 
areas of influence of COVID-19, while scenarios in the same scenario set have different 630 
assumptions about duration of the containment and the strictness of the containment. 631 
Our first scenario set, China only, assumes that the outbreak of COVID-2019 is only in 632 
mainland China. In this scenario set, labour supply and transportation in mainland China will 633 
be restricted due to the need for epidemic control from the fourth week of 2020 (i.e., 22nd 634 
January 2020). To examine the impact of policy strictness and duration of the outbreak on the 635 
world economic system, we set four strictness (i.e., 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%) and three 636 
durations (i.e., 2, 4, 6 months), see the yellow block in the table below. For instance, the 637 
scenario "China only 20%-2m" means that the epidemic lasts for two months with labour 638 
supply and transportation restrictions of 20%. 639 
Isolation measures have different effects on labour supply in different sectors. We set a 640 
specific multiplier for each sector based on three factors, i.e., the exposure level of the sector's 641 
work, whether it is the lifeline, and whether it is possible to work at home. If a sector's work 642 
exposure level is low, or it is the lifeline sector, or it is easy to work at home, its' multiplier 643 
will be small, vice versa.  644 
 
Then, the constraints on labour supply in each sector are determined by two parts, i.e., 645 
benchmark constraint in the scenario and multipliers for the sector. For instance, we assume 646 
that the multiplier for the wheat production sector is 0.5 because the level of exposure to its 647 
production activities is relatively low. Then, in the scenario "China only 20%-2m", the labour 648 
supply in the wheat production sector will fall by 10%, i.e., 20% multiplied by 0.5. At the 649 
same time, in the scenario set, transportation between mainland China and other regions will 650 
also fall by 50% during the duration of the epidemic. 651 
The epidemic not only affects the global economic system from the supply side, but also 652 
affects economic output through its impact on consumer demand. Most obviously, tourism 653 
demand for the region with COVID-2019 outbreaks will drop significantly. Due to lack of 654 
data, we simply assume that the final demand for the two sectors, "Recreation and other 655 
services" and "Accommodation, Food and service activities", in the outbreaking area fell by 656 
99% during the duration of the outbreak. 657 
 658 
Scenario-sets table 659 
 China only Europe and the U.S. Global 
Duration 2 months 4 months 6 months 2 months 4 months 6 months 2 months 4 months 6 months 
St
ri
ct
ne
ss
 20% 20%-2m 20%-4m 20%-6m 20%-2m 20%-4m 20%-6m 20%-2m 20%-4m 20%-6m 
40% 40%-2m 40%-4m 40%-6m 40%-2m 40%-4m 40%-6m 40%-2m 40%-4m 40%-6m 
60% 60%-2m 60%-4m 60%-6m 60%-2m 60%-4m 60%-6m 60%-2m 60%-4m 60%-6m 
80% 80%-2m 80%-4m 80%-6m 80%-2m 80%-4m 80%-6m 80%-2m 80%-4m 80%-6m 
 660 
In the second set of scenarios (Europe and the U.S.), we assume that regions with the current 661 
severe epidemic situation have taken measures from the eleventh week (11th March 2020) to 662 
control their epidemic. These countries include the United States, France, Germany, Italy, the 663 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Spain, and Iran. The labour and transportation 664 
restrictions are consistent with the settings of the scenario set China only, and take “China 665 
only 80%-2m” as default in mainland China, which basically matches with the reality shown 666 
in the Baidu big data. 667 
In the last set of scenarios (Global), we assume that in addition to mainland China and the 668 
economies in the scenario set Europe and the U.S., other economies in the world also began to 669 
take measures to control the epidemic in the 15th week (8th April 2020). The labour and 670 
transportation restrictions are consistent with the settings of the scenario set China only and 671 
Europe and the U.S., and take “China only 80%-2m” as default for mainland China, “Europe 672 
and the U.S. 60%-4m” as default in economies in the scenario set Europe and the U.S.. 673 
 674 
Finally, we design and model three post-pandemic scenarios of recovery as follows: 675 
• Pandemic as a new normal scenario: Starting with January 2020, China only placed 80% 676 
strictness for 2 months, then reduced to 20% for 12 months. EU and the U.S. placed 60% 677 
strictness for 4 months, then reduced to 20% strictness for 12 months. Global placed 40% 678 
strictness for 6 months, then reduced to 20% and gradually relaxing to 0% over a period 679 
of 12 months. 680 
• Recurrent pandemic scenario with global cooperation: Starting with January 2020, each 681 
country’s lockdown (i.e. China 80%-2m, Europe and the U.S. 60%-4m, all other countries 682 
 
40%-6m) is first relaxed to 0% strictness over a period of 2 months, followed by a 683 
3-month period of no restrictions and then another round of strict (80%), 2-month global 684 
lockdown starting January 2021.   685 
• Recurrent pandemic scenario without global cooperation: Starting with January 2020, 686 
each country’s lockdown (i.e. China 80%-2m, Europe and the U.S. 60%-4m, all other 687 
countries 40%-6m) is first relaxed to 0% strictness over a period of 2 months, followed by 688 
a 3 month period of no restrictions, and then another round of the same less strict, longer 689 
lockdowns starting January 2021, as the first round.   690 
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